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1Deleting Secret Data with Public Verifiability
Feng Hao, Member, IEEE, Dylan Clarke, Avelino Francisco Zorzo
Abstract—Existing software-based data erasure programs can be summarized as following the same one-bit-return protocol: the
deletion program performs data erasure and returns either success or failure. However, such a one-bit-return protocol turns the
data deletion system into a black box – the user has to trust the outcome but cannot easily verify it. This is especially problematic
when the deletion program is encapsulated within a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), and the user has no access to the code
inside.
In this paper, we present a cryptographic solution that aims to make the data deletion process more transparent and verifiable.
In contrast to the conventional black/white assumptions about TPM (i.e., either completely trust or distrust), we introduce a third
assumption that sits in between: namely, “trust-but-verify”. Our solution enables a user to verify the correct implementation of two
important operations inside a TPM without accessing its source code: i.e., the correct encryption of data and the faithful deletion
of the key. Finally, we present a proof-of-concept implementation of the SSE system on a resource-constrained Java card to
demonstrate its practical feasibility. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic solution to the secure data deletion problem
based on a “trust-but-verify” paradigm, together with a concrete prototype implementation.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Secure data erasure requires permanently deleting
digital data from a physical medium such that the
data is irrecoverable [13]. This requirement plays a
critical role in all practical data management systems,
and in satisfying several government regulations on
data protection [25]. For the past two decades, this
subject has been extensively studied by researchers
in both academia and industry, resulting in a rich
body of literature [5], [7], [8], [13], [14], [17], [23], [25],
[26], [28], [33], [35]. A recent survey on this topic is
published in [27] .
1.1 One-bit return
To delete data securely is a non-trivial problem. It
has been generally agreed that no existing software-
based solutions can guarantee the complete removal
of data from the storage medium [27]. To explain the
context of this field, we will abstract away imple-
mentation details of existing solutions, and focus at
a higher and more intuitive protocol level. Existing
deletion methods can be described using essentially
the same protocol, which we call the “one-bit-return”
protocol. In this protocol, the user sends a command
– usually through a host computer – to delete data
from a storage system, and receives a one-bit reply
indicating the status of the operation. The process can
be summarized as follows.
User → Storage : Delete data
Storage → User : Success/Failure (1 bit )
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Deletion by unlinking. Take the deletion in the
Windows operating system as an example. When the
user wishes to delete a file (say by hitting the “delete”
button), the operating system removes the link of the
file from the underlying file system, and returns one
bit to the user: Success. However, the return of the
“Success” bit can be misleading. Although the link
of the file has been removed, the content of the file
remains on the disk. An attacker with a forensic tool
can easily recover the deleted file by scanning the disk
[12]. The same problem also applies to the default
deletion program bundled in other operating systems
(e.g., Apple and Linux).
Deletion by overwriting. Obviously, merely unlink-
ing the file is not sufficient. In addition, the content of
the file should be overwritten with random data. This
has been proposed in several papers [5], [13], [14] and
specified in various standards (e.g., [18]). However,
one inherent limitation with the overwriting methods
is that they cannot guarantee the complete removal of
data. As concluded in [13]: “it is effectively impossible
to sanitize storage locations by simply overwriting
them, no matter how many overwrite passes are made
or what data patterns are written.” The conclusion
holds for not only magnetic drives [13], but also tapes
[7], optical disks [14] and flash-based solid state drives
[33]. In all these cases, an attacker, equipped with
advanced microsoping tools, may recover overwritten
data based on the physical remanence of the deleted
data left on the storage medium. Therefore, although
overwriting data makes the recovery harder, it does
not change the basic one-bit-return protocol. Same as
before, the return of “Success” cannot guarantee the
actual deletion of data.
Deletion by cryptography. Boneh and Lipton [7]
were among the first in proposing the use of cryp-
tography to address the secure data erasure problem,
2with a number of follow-up works [17], [20], [21],
[24]–[26], [35]. In general, a cryptography-based so-
lution works by encrypting all data before saving it
to the disk, and later deleting the data by discard-
ing the decryption key. This approach is especially
desirable when duplicate copies of data are backed
up in distributed locations so it becomes impossible
to overwrite every copy [7]. The use of cryptography
essentially changes the problem of deleting a large
amount of data to that of deleting a short key (say
a 128-bit AES key). Still, the fundamental question
remains: how to securely delete the key?
1.2 Key management
When cryptography is used to address the data era-
sure problem, the key management becomes critically
important. There are several approaches proposed in
the past literature to manage cryptographic keys.
The first method is to simply save the key on the
disk, alongside the encrypted data (typically as part
of the meta data in the file header) [17], [20], [25],
[26]. Deleting the data involves overwriting the disk
location where the key is stored. Once the key is
erased, the ciphertext immediately becomes useless
[7]. This has the advantage of quickly erasing data
since only a small block of data (16 bytes for AES-128)
needs to be overwritten. However, if the key is saved
on the disk, cryptography may not add much security
in ensuring data deletion [16]. On the contrary, it
may even degrade security if not handled properly
– instead of recovering a large amount of overwritten
data, the attacker now just needs to recover a short
128-bit key. This may significantly increase the chance
of a total recovery. Once the key is restored, the
deleted data will be fully recovered. (We assume the
ciphertext is available to the attacker, which is usually
the case.)
The second method is to use a user-defined pass-
word as the encryption key [35]. The key is derived on
the fly in RAM upon the user’s entry of the password
so it is never saved on the disk. However, passwords
are naturally bounded by low entropy (typically 20-
30 bits) [3]. Hence, cryptographic keys derived from
passwords are subject to brute-force attacks. As soon
as the attacker has access to ciphertext data, the
ciphertext becomes an oracle, against which the at-
tacker can recover the key through the exhaustive
search. Instead of directly using a password-derived
encryption key, Lee et al. proposed to first generate a
random AES key for encrypting data and then use the
password to wrap the AES key and store the wrapped
key on the disk [21]. This is essentially equivalent to
deriving the key from the password. The wrapped key
now becomes an oracle, against which the attacker can
run the exhaustive search.
The third method is to store the key in a dencentral-
ized network. Along this line, Geambasu et. al. pro-
pose a solution called Vanish, which generates a
random key to encrypt the user’s data locally and
then distributes shares of the key using Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme to a global-sale, peer-to-peer,
distributed hash tables (DHTs). The shares of the
key naturally disappear (vanish), due to the fact that
the DHT is constantly changing. However, Wochok
et. al. [32] subsequently show two Sybil attacks
that work by continuously crawling the DHT and
recovering the stored key shared before they vanish.
They conclude that the original Vanish scheme cannot
guarantee the secure deletion of the key.
The fourth method is to store the key in a tamper
resistant hardware module (e.g., TPM) and define the
Application Programming Interface (API) to manage
the stored keys. This is in line with the standard
practice employed in financial industry for key man-
agement [3]. In this paper, we will adopt the same
TPM-based approach. However, the main difficulty
with the TPM lies in how the API should be defined.
In 2005, Perlman first proposed to use a TPM for
assured data deletion [24]. In her solution, data is
always encrypted before being saved onto the disk.
All decryption keys are stored in a tamper resistant
module and do not live outside the module. Erasing
the keys will effectively delete the data. To delete
a key, the user simply sends a delete command to
the module with a reference to that key and receives
a one-bit confirmation if the operation is successful.
Clearly, this design still follows the one-bit return
protocol, which assumes complete trust on the correct
implementation of the software inside the module.
1.3 Motivation for public verifiability
There are similar examples of black-box systems in
security. For instance, as explained in [19], the Direct
Recording Electronic (DRE) e-voting machines, widely
used in the US between 2000 and 2004, worked like
a black box. The system returns a tally at the end of
the election, which the voters have to trust but cannot
easily verify. The lack of verifiability had raised wide-
spread suspicion about the integrity of the software
inside the voting machine and hence the integrity of
the election, eventually forcing several states in the US
to abandon DRE machines. Today, the importance of
having public verifiability in any e-voting system has
been commonly acknowledged and progress is being
made in deploying verifiable e-voting in real-world
elections [2], [6].
Unfortunately, the need for public verifiability has
been almost entirely neglected in the secure data
erasure field. This is an important omission that we
aim to address in this research work.
When a TPM is used for key management, the
trust assumption about the TPM becomes a critical
question. In the past literature [3], there exist two
disparate assumptions about TPM: either completely
trust or totally distrust. However, we find neither of
3such black/white assumptions is adequate in captur-
ing the reality. On one hand, the fact that a TPM stores
cryptographic keys implies an inherent trust. But on
the other hand, the encapsulated nature of a TPM
prevents users from verifying the internal software,
which inevitably adds distrust. These seemingly con-
tradictory dual-facets are echoes of similar problems
in e-voting, where a DRE machine is used as a trusted
device to record votes, but the public have no access to
its internal code. The established solution to address
this dilemma is “trust-but-verify” [2], [6], [15]: i.e.,
demanding the voting machine to produce additional
cryptographic proofs such that by verifying the cor-
rectness of those proofs a voter can gain confidence
about the integrity of the internal software (this is also
succinctly summarized by Ron Rivest and John Wack
as the “software independence” principle).
Summary of main idea. The main idea of this work
follows the same design principle based on “trust-but-
verify”. By applying cryptographic techniques, we
allow an end user to verify the correct implementation
of two important operations inside a TPM: encryption
and deletion.
First, the user is able to explicitly verify that the en-
cryption follows the correct procedure (i.e., the cipher-
text is free from containing any trap-door block). By
contrast, previous cryptography-based data deletion
solutions only provide implicit assurance: by checking
if the decryption produces the same original plaintext,
one gains implicit assurance about the correctness
of the encryption. However, we argue that such an
implicit assurance is inadequate (in light of Snowden
revelations [40]): a TPM manufacturer might be co-
erced by a state-funded adversary to compress a trap-
door block into the ciphertext so to keep the output
length the same. The user will not be able to notice
any difference and the decryption can still produce
the original plaintext (we will explain more details
in Section 6.2.2). This issue will be addressed in our
solution through the Audit function.
Second, the user is able to verify the outcome of a
deletion process. Obviously, because using software
means can never guarantee the complete deletion
of data, verifying the successful erasure of data ap-
pears intuitively impossible. However, “you normally
change the problem if you can’t solve it.” (David
Wheeler [31]) Here, we slightly change the prob-
lem by shifting verifying the successful deletion of
data to verifying the failure of that operation. The
deletion process returns a digital signature, which
cryptographically binds the deletion program’s com-
mitment of deleting a secret key to the outcome of
that operation. In case the supposedly deleted key is
recovered later, the signature can serve as publicly
verifiable evidence to prove the vendor’s liability.
More technical details will be explained in Section 4
after we cover the related work in Section 2 and the
relevant cryptographic primitives in Section 3. Sec-
tion 5 explains the proof-of-concept implementation
with detailed performance measurements, followed
by security analysis in Section 6. Finally, Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we review related works that discuss
the importance of verifiability for secure data deletion.
In 2010, Paul and Saxena [22] aim to give users
the ability to verify the outcome of secure data dele-
tion. They propose a scheme called the “Proof of
Erasability” (PoE), in which a host program deletes
data by overwriting the disk with random patterns
and the disk must return the same patterns as the
proof of erasability. Clearly, this so-called proof is
not cryptographically binding, nor publicly verifiable,
since the data storage system may cheat by echoing
the received patterns without actually overwriting the
disk.
In ESORICS’10, Perito and Tsudik [23] study how
to securely erase memory in an embedded device,
as a preparatory step for updating the firmware in
the device. They propose a protocol called Proofs of
Secure Erasure (PoSE-s). In this protocol, the host
program sends a string of random patterns to the
embedded device. To prove that the memory has been
securely erased, the embedded device should return
the same string of patterns. It is assumed that the
embedded device has limited memory - just enough
to hold the received random patterns. This protocol
works essentially the same way as the PoE in [22], but
with an additional assumption of bounded storage.
Finally, in 2012, Wanson and Wei [34] investigate
the effectiveness of the built-in data erasure mecha-
nisms in several commercial Solid State Drives (SSDs).
They discovered that the built-in “sanitize” methods
in several SSD were completely ineffective due to
software bugs. Based on this discovery, they stress the
importance of being able to independently verify the
data deletion outcome. They propose a verification
method that works as follows. First of all, a series
of recognizable patterns are written to the entire
drive. Then, the drive is erased by calling the built-
in “sanitize” command. Next, the drive is manually
dismantled and a custom-built probing tool (made by
the authors) is used to read raw bits from the memory
in search for any unerased data. This approach can
be useful for factory testing. However, it may prove
difficult for ordinary users to perform.
In summary, several researchers have recognized
the importance of verifiability in the secure data dele-
tion process and proposed some solutions. But none
of those solutions have used any cryptography. Our
work differs from theirs in that we aim to provide
public verifiability for a secure data deletion system by
adopting public key cryptography.
43 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
In this section, we explain two relevant cryptographic
primitives: the Diffie-Hellman Integrated Encryption
Scheme (DHIES) and Chaum-Pedersen Zero Knowl-
edge Proof.
3.1 DHIES
The DHIES is a public key encryption system adapted
from the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol and
has been included into the draft standards of ANSI
X9.63 and IEEE P1363a [1]. The scheme is designed to
provide security against chosen ciphertext attacks. It
makes use of a finite cyclic group, which for example
can be the same cyclic group used in DSA or ECDSA
[29]. Here, we use the ECDSA-like group for illustra-
tion. Let E be an underlying elliptic curve for ECDSA
and G be a base point on the curve with the prime
order n.
Assume the user’s private key is v, which is chosen
at random from [1, n − 1]. The corresponding public
key is Qv = v · G. The encryption in DHIES works
as follows. The program first generates an ephemeral
public key Qu = u · G where u ∈R [1, n − 1]. It then
derives a shared secret following the Diffie-Hellman
protocol: S = u ·Qv . The shared secret is then hashed
through a cryptographic hash function H , and the
output is split into two keys: encKey and macKey.
First, the encKey key is used to encrypt a message to
obtain encM . Then, the macKey key is used to com-
pute a MAC tag from the encrypted message encM .
The final ciphertext consists of the ephemeral key Qu,
the MAC tag and the encrypted message encM . This
encryption process is summarized in Figure 1.
The decryption procedure starts with checking if
the ephemeral public key Qu is a valid element in
the designated group – a step commonly known as
“public key validation”1. Next, it derives the same
shared secret value following the Diffie-Hellman pro-
tocol. Based on the shared secret, a hash function is
applied to derive encKey and macKey, according to
Figure 1. Upon the successful validation of the MAC
tag by using the macKey, the encrypted message will
be decrypted accordingly by using the encKey. More
details about DHIES can be found in [1].
It is worth noting that DHIES is essentially built on
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, but with
adaptations to make it suitable for a secure data
storage application. For example, Alice can encrypt a
message under her own public key using DHIES, so
that only she can decrypt the message at a later time.
1. The original DHIES paper [1] does not explicitly mandate
public key validation on the ephemeral public key, but as explained
by Antipa et al. in [4], the security proofs in DHIES [1] implicitly
assume the received points must be on the valid elliptic curve;
otherwise, the scheme may be subject to invalid-curve attacks.
In our specification, we regard such public key validation as a
mandatory step.
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Figure 1: Encrypting with DHIES [1]. The symmetric
encryption algorithm is denoted as E, the MAC algo-
rithm as T and the hash function as H . The shaded
rectangles constitute the ciphertext.
In some sense, it is like Alice securely communicating
with herself in the future.
For any key exchange protocol, there is always
a key confirmation step, which is either implicit or
explicit [29]. The original DHIES scheme is designed
to provide only implicit key confirmation – the key is
implicitly confirmed by checking the MAC tag. How-
ever, there are two drawbacks with this approach.
First, it does not distinguish two different failure
modes in case the MAC verification is unsuccessful.
In the first mode, wrong session keys may have been
derived from the key exchange process. For example,
the message had been encrypted by a different key
v′ · G, v′ 6= v. In the second mode, the encrypted
message encM may have been corrupted (due to
storage errors or malicious tampering). It is sometimes
useful for an application to be able to distinguish the
two modes and handle the failure accordingly, but
this is not possible in the original DHIES. The second
drawback is performance. In DHIES, the latency for
performing implicit key confirmation (through check-
ing MAC) is always linear to the size of the ciphertext.
However, this linear time complexity O(n) can prove
unnecessarily inefficient if the MAC failure was due to
the derivation of wrong session keys. (We will explain
more on this after we describe the Audit function in
Section 4.)
We address both limitations by adding an explicit
key confirmation step to DHIES. This change provides
explicit assurance on the correct derivation of the
session keys. It is consistent with the common under-
standing that in key exchange protocols, explicit key
confirmation is generally considered more desirable
than implicit key confirmation [29]. We will explain
the modified DHIES in detail in Section 4.
3.2 Chaum-Pedersen protocol
Assume the same Elliptic Curve setting (E, G, n) as
above. Given a tuple (G,X,R,Z) = (G, x ·G, r ·G, x ·r ·
G) where x, r ∈R [1, n−1], the Chaum-Pedersen proto-
col is an honest verifier Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP)
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s ∈ [1, n− 1] (A,B) = (s ·G, s ·X)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
c←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− c ∈ [1, n− 1]
t = s+ c · r mod n−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ accept if and only if
t ·G = A+ c ·R∧
t ·X = B + c · Z
Figure 2: Chaum-Pedersen protocol [9]: a zero-
knowledge proof technique to prove the statement
that (G,X,R,Z) = (G, x · G, r · G, x · r · G) is a DDH
tuple.
Figure 3: System overview
technique for proving that the tuple (G,X,R,Z) is
a Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) tuple [9]. This is
equivalent to proving that logGX = logR Z, or alter-
natively, logGR = logX Z. For the Chaum-Pedersen
protocol to work, the prover must know either the
r or x value. Without loss of generality, we assume
the prover knows r. The Chaum-Pedersen protocol
works interactively between a prover and a verifier in
three message flows, as shown in Figure 2. In our so-
lution, we use a non-interactive variant of the Chaum-
Pedersen protocol, which is realized by applying the
standard Fiat-Shamir heuristics [10].
4 SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we will propose a Secure Storage
and Erasure (SSE) system. As shown in Figure 3,
in an architectural view, the system comprises three
components: 1) a tamper resistant hardware module
handles key management; 2) a disk drive that stores
digital data; 3) a host program that controls the disk
drive and communicates with the module, through a
SSE protocol. In the paper, we will use TPM to refer
to the tamper resistant hardware module.
One core functionality of a TPM is to be “tamper
resistant”, so that secrets can be safely kept inside.
However, many past research works have demon-
strated that it might be possible to extract secrets from
a TPM in various ways, e.g., semi-invasive attacks,
API attacks and side-channel attacks [3]. Hence, it
is prudent not to assume the “tamper resistance”
in its absolute term. Instead, we acknowledge the
possibility that a TPM might be reverse-engineered
and its secrets extracted. However, we assume such
attacks will incur a high cost. Under this assumption,
a TPM is still useful as long as the cost of reverse-
engineering is significantly higher than the value of
the data that the TPM protects.
4.1 Threat model
In our threat model, we will consider threats from
three different angles: the data thief, the TPM provider
and the user.
First, the obvious threat concerns a data thief who
has captured the entire system (TPM, host and disk)
and whose goal is to recover the deleted data. We as-
sume the attacker is able to not only read all unerased
data from the disk but also recover overwritten bits
on the disk. However, since the data is all encrypted,
the attacker must have access to the decryption keys,
which are stored in the secure memory of the TPM.
We assume the cost of reverse-engineering a TPM is
higher than the value of the data that it protects.
The second type of threat comes from the TPM
provider. In general, the TPM provider should have
no business incentives to install malicious firmware in
the TPM. However, two possible scenarios need to be
considered. First, the firmware may contain software
bugs. Second, the TPM provider might be coerced
by a state-funded security agency to add trapdoors
in its product2. In our threat model, we assume that
the TPM is sold in a mass commercial market, hence
any bugs or trapdoors (if any) will exist in not just
one TPM, but all products in the market. In other
words, we do not consider targeted attacks against
a particular user.
Third, we consider the threat from a user. A user
differs from a data thief in that she is the legitimate
possessor of the TPM and holds the Service Level
Agreement. It is expected that the user only saves
the encrypted data onto the disk, so that later the
data can be deleted by just erasing the key. However,
a mishaving user may deviate from this expectation
as follows. In parallel to saving the encrypted data
onto the disk, she also backs up the plaintext data
in some secret location. In that case, simply erasing
the key is useless to delete the data. In our model,
we do not consider this threat as it trivially breaks all
cryptography-based data deletion methods. Second,
a user might try to reverse-engineer the TPM and
claim compensation based on the SLA. We will further
analyze this scenario in Section 6 after we explain the
full protocol in the next section.
4.2 SSE protocol
The TPM communicates with the host, following a
Secure Storage and Erasure (SSE) protocol. This pro-
tocol is the central element in the entire system design.
It operates in the same group setting as ECDSA (or
DSA). Here, we choose the ECDSA setting, so it
is consistent with the actual implementation of the
2. This seemingly remote threat becomes realistic in the light of
the recent revelations by Edward Snowden [40]. We believe in the
post-Snowden world people will take an even more critical view
on TPM, and our “trust-but-verify” paradigm is one step towards
addressing that concern.
6protocol in a Java Card, as we will explain in Section
5. As before, let E be the underlying elliptic curve of
ECDSA and G be a base point on the curve with the
prime order n.
Each TPM contains a unique ECDSA signature key
pair: Prvt and Pubt, which are generated on-board
during the factory initialization stage. The ECDSA
public key for every TPM is published on the TPM
provider’s website so that anyone can access it, while
the private key is securely kept inside the TPM. As
an overview, the SSE protocol specifies the following
API functions:
• KeyGen. To generate a random public/private
key pair;
• Encrypt. To encrypt data with a specified public
key;
• Decrypt. To decrypt data with a specified private
key;
• Audit. To audit if encryption was done correctly;
• Delete. To delete a specified private key with a
digital signature returned as a proof of deletion.
To call the above functions, the user must be au-
thenticated first. This can be realized in several ways:
for example, passwords, biometrics, etc. For simplic-
ity, we assume the user has passed the authentication
and can call the functions. Details of each API function
are explained below (the notations are summarized in
Table 1).
4.2.1 Key generation
KeyGen(1k, C) creates an instance of the client user
C. It takes as input a security parameter 1k and the
identity of the user C, generates a private key on-
board PrvCi := dCi ∈R [1, n− 1], and returns the cor-
responding public key PubCi := dCi ·G and an index
reference Ci to the created key pair. The user C is free
to create as many instances as she wishes, subject to
the constraint of the maximum persistent memory in
the TPM. As an example, with 160-bit n, 32-bit index
Ci and a TPM of 16 MB EEPROM memory (see [38]),
up to 666,667 user instances can be created. The user
may choose to use different instances for encrypting
different types of files. The KeyGen function can be
formalized as below (for simplicity, we will omit the
return of error in all functions):
Host → TPM : 1k, C
TPM : Generate PrvCi := dCi
TPM → Host : PubCi := dCi ·G, Ci
4.2.2 Encryption
Encrypt(Ci,m) takes as input the reference to the
created user instance Ci, a message m and returns
the encrypted message under the public key PubCi .
For the encryption, we adopt the Diffie-Hellman In-
tegrated Encryption Scheme (DHIES) [1]. First, the
TPM generates an ephemeral public key Qη = dη · G
where dη ∈R [1, n − 1]. It then calculates two ses-
sion keys, which include an encryption key kencη =
H(dCi · Qη || 0x01) and a MAC key kmacη = H(dCi ·
Qη || 0x10). Both keys are used to encrypt the message
in an authenticated manner to obtain EAuthkη (m). In
addition, the TPM generates a key-confirmation key
kc = H(dCi ·Qη || 0x11) and outputs a one-way hash of
kc. This is to allow explicit key confirmation during
the latter decryption and audit steps. The returned
ciphertext will be stored in the mass storage device.
The encryption is performed inside the TPM as it
involves securely generating a random factor (i.e., dη),
whose secrecy also needs to be protected. It is possible
to perform public key encryption in a host computer,
but the standard industry solution is to do that in a
tamper resistant device so that all security-sensitive
key materials are protected by the tamper resistance
[3]. The Encrypt function can be formalized as:
Host → TPM : Ci, m
TPM → Host : Qη := dη ·G, H(kc), EAuthkη (m)
4.2.3 Decryption
Decrypt(Ci, Qη, H(kc), E
Auth
kη
(m)) takes as input the
reference to an existing user instance Ci, the ciphertext
obtained from the earlier encryption step, and returns
the decrypted message if the verifications on the key
confirmation string and MAC are successful. The TPM
first validates that Qη is a valid public key on the
curve. It then computes k′c = H(dCi · Qη || 0x11) and
proceeds to decryption only if H(k′c) = H(kc). The de-
cryption procedure follows subsequently as described
in DHIES [1]. Upon the successful verification of the
MAC tag, the encrypted message will be decrypted
and the original plaintext m will be returned. The
Decrypt function can be formalized as:
Host → TPM : Ci, Qη, H(kc), EAuthkη (m)
TPM → Host : m
4.2.4 Audit
Audit(Ci, Qη, H(kc)) takes as input the reference to an
existing user instance Ci, the ephemeral public key Qη
and the key confirmation string H(kc), and allows the
user to verify whether the earlier encryption operation
was done correctly. The TPM first checks that Qη
is a valid public key on the curve, and verifies if
H(H(dCi ·Qη || 0x11)) = H(kc). It then outputs dCi ·Qη
and a Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP), which proves that
logGdCi ·G = logQηdCi ·Qη without leaking anything
about the private key dCi . The ZKP is based on the
Chaum-Pedersen protocol [9], which is made non-
interactive by applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristics [10].
Because of the use of a key-confirmation string, it is
unnecessary to feed in the entire encrypted message
(i.e., EAuthkη (m)) into the audit function input. This
improves the efficiency as the size of the encrypted
7Notations Meaning
Prvt, Pubt A pair of unique ECDSA keys for each TPM
C The client user
Ci One instance of the client user
PrvCi The private key of the client instance, PrvCi := dCi
PubCi The public key of the client instance, PubCi := dCi ·G
m An input message
Qη The ephemeral public key during DHIES Qη = dη ·G
kencη , k
mac
η The session keys derived from DHIES for authenticated encryption
kc The key-confirmation key derived from DHIES for explicit key confirmation
EAuthkη (m) Authenticated encryption of m using the session keys {k
enc
η , k
mac
η }
E(PubCi ,m) Encryption of m under PubCi using DHIES, E(PubCi ,m) := {Qη , H(kc), EAuthkη (m)}
η The reference to the ciphertext E(PubCi ,m)
ZKPη A Zero Knowledge Proof to prove the well-formedness of ciphertext η
SLAdelCi A Service Level Agreement for the deletion of client instance Ci
Sig(...) A signed message using the TPM’s ECDSA private key Prvt
Table 1: Notations and meaning
message may potentially be large. With the output
from the audit function, the host is able to compute
the encryption and MAC keys based on kencη = H(dCi ·
Qη || 0x01) and kmacη = H(dCi ·Qη || 0x10). With these
symmetric keys, the host is able to fully verify if the
message was encrypted correctly using these keys.
Note that this auditing only reveals the symmetric
encryption and MAC keys within one DHIES session;
the secrecy of the keys derived in other sessions is not
affected. The Audit function can be formalized as:
Host → TPM : Ci, Qη, H(kc)
TPM → Host : dCi ·Qη, . . .
ZKPη [logGdCi ·G = logQηdCi ·Qη]
4.2.5 Delete
Delete(Ci) deletes a user instance Ci by overwriting
its private key dCi in the TPM’s protected memory
and returns SLAdelCi , which is a Service Level Agree-
ment {“Delete”, PubCi } signed by the TPM’s ECDSA
signing key. After the erasure of the private key, all
messages encrypted under PubCi can no longer be
decrypted. Assume the TPM had failed to erase the
private key dCi properly and that the key is later
discovered by the user. The user can present dCi
together with SLAdelCi , as publicly verifiable evidence,
that the TPM had failed to provide the secure data
deletion service as promised. Based on the evidence
and the terms in the Service Level Agreement, the user
should be entitled to compensation (or money back).
The Delete function can be formalized as:
Host → TPM : Ci
TPM → Host : SLAdelCi := Sig(“Delete”,PubCi)
5 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we will describe a full prototype
implementation of the proposed SSE system, based
on using a standard Java card [39] as a TPM for
key management, a MacBook laptop (1.7 GHz with
4 GB memory) for the host and a standard disk
drive for mass data storage. As we will show, this is
a non-trivial development effort. To our knowledge,
what we provide is the first public implementation
of DHIES and Chaum-Pedersen ZKP on a resource
constrained Java card. (The full source code for the
prototype can be found at the end of the paper.)
The Java card we use has a dual interface, support-
ing both contact and contactless communication. We
use the contactless interface for all experiments. The
chip on the card has an 80 KB EEPROM for persistent
storage and an 8 KB RAM for holding volatile data
in memory. The card is compliant with Java Card
Standard 2.2.2, but also supports some additional
APIs from Java Card Standard 3.0.1. In particular,
it supports ALG_EC_SVDP_DHC_PLAIN under the
javacard.security.KeyAgreement interface, which allows
obtaining the plain shared secret (instead of a SHA-
1 hash of the secret) from the Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH) key exchange protocol. This API
is essential for the prototype implementation of our
system.
One obstacle we encountered is that the existing
Java card API standards does not support modular
multiplication of big numbers (see [30], [39]). To the
best of our knowledge, no Java Cards currently avail-
able in the market provide the API support to perform
this basic modular operation. Therefore, we had to
implement the big number modular multiplication
from scratch by ourselves using the primitive arith-
metic operators and byte arrays (without involving
any hardware support from the low-level native C
library on the card). It takes about 150 lines of Java
code to execute one modular multiplication.
Regarding the elliptic curve setting, we chose the
standard P-256 curve as defined in the Digital Signa-
ture Standards specification [37]. When the Java card
applet is first loaded into the chip, upon initialization
it generates a random ECDSA key pair over the P-256
curve. The same curve is used for the generation of
all further public/private key pairs required.
8In the following, we will explain the implemen-
tation details and performance measurements of all
the functions specified in the SSE protocol. For each
function, the latency is measured in terms of the delay
in the card processing and in the card communication
(via the contactless interface). We repeated the experi-
ments thirty times and summarize the average results
in Figure 4 and Table 2.
KeyGen. This function involves generating a ran-
dom public/private key pair over the P-256 curve
for a new user instance. The public key, along with
a 16-bit unique identifier, is returned to the user.
The private key (32 bytes) is stored in the TPM’s
EEPROM. To facilitate the encryption operation later,
we also keep the public key in EEPROM. The card
only supports the EC public key in the uncompressed
form, so the size of the public key is 64 bytes. Given
that the Java card that we use has 80 KB EEPROM
in total and that the SSE program takes up 16 KB
storage in EEPROM, we can create about 650 random
EC public/private pairs. As shown in Table 2, this
operation takes a constant 835 ms in total.
Encrypt. The function receives a plaintext file, en-
crypts it using DHIES and returns the ciphertext. In
one DHIES session, two symmetric session keys are
derived to encrypt the file in an authenticated manner
(see Figure 1). In theory, there should be no limit in
how long is the input file that can be encrypted under
one DHIES session. However, in practice, there is an
upper limit due to the constrained memory size in
the Java card. (The reason shall become more evident
later when we explain how the Decrypt operation
works.) In our implementation, up to 2 KB data can
be encrypted in one DHIES session. For a plaintext file
bigger than 2 KB, the host program needs to divide
the file into block with each less than 2 KB and encrypt
each block in one DHIES session.
Another constraint in the implementation is the size
of the APDU buffer. The card receives and sends
messages through an APDU buffer, which can hold
data up to 255 bytes at one time. Therefore, for a long
message, the encryption cannot be done in one oper-
ation, and needs to be done in four steps. First, the
card receives an instance ID that identifies the public
key. Accordingly, it creates an ephemeral public key,
and computes the DHIES session keys. The session
keys comprise a 128-bit AES key for encrypting data
and another 128-bit AES key for computing MAC. The
encryption is performed in the CBC mode. A random
IV for AES-CBC is generated and returned to the host
in this step (this to optimize the bandwidth usage so
that in the subsequent step, the plaintext data can fill
up the entire APDU buffer and the returned ciphertext
will occupy the whole buffer as well). Second, the
message is divided into segments with each segment
not more than 255 bytes. The card receives each
segment in turn, performs encryption and saves the
intermediate results in RAM. This step is repeated
Algorithm 1 Encryption in one DHIES session
Input: User instance reference Ci, message m, elliptic curve E with
generator G of order n, secure hash function H ;
Output: Ephemeral public key Qη , hashed key confirmation key
H(kc), encrypted message EAuthkη (m); initialisation vector IV ;
1: Client sends Ci to card;
2: Card retrieves instance private key dCi corresponding to user
instance Ci;
3: Card randomly chooses dη ∈ [1, . . . n];
4: Card sets Qη = dη .G;
5: Card sets kencη = H(dCi .Qη ‖ 0x01);
6: Card sets kmacη = H(dCi .Qη ‖ 0x10);
7: Card generates random IV and returns this to the client;
8: Client divides m into segments mi with each segment not more
than 255 bytes;
9: for segments mi do
10: Client sends mi to card;
11: Card generates Ekη (mi) using AES-CBC with key k
enc
η ;
12: Card generates MACi for Ekη (mi) using AES-CBC with key
kmacη and with initialisation vector set to ZERO when i = 0
and MACi−1 when i>0;
13: Card obtains the final MAC with the entire encrypted message
to give EAuthkη (m);
14: Card sets kc = H(dCi .Qη ‖ 0x11);
15: Card returns to the client Qη , H(kc), EAuthkη (m);
until the penultimate segment of the message. Third,
it receives the last segment of the message and final-
izes the encryption. Fourth, a MAC is returned, which
is computed over the entire ciphertext using CBC-
MAC. Full implementation details about the DHIES
encryption are summarized in Algorithm 1
The latency measurements for the encryption op-
eration are shown in Figure 4a. For each input file
of different sizes, the Encrypt operation is invoked
to encrypt the file and return the ciphertext. The
measured total latency includes both the card pro-
cessing and card communication delays. In order to
obtain the communication delay, we conduct a sepa-
rate experiment. We add a dummy API to the card,
which works superficially similar to Encrypt in that it
accepts an input file and returns an output file that
has the same size as what the Encrypt API would
return. However, the dummy API does not perform
any processing on the input data and it immediately
outputs a fixed data string that is stored in the card
memory back to the host. We measure the latency of
calling the dummy API and take that measurement as
the communication delay. The card processing delay
is obtained by subtracting the communication delay
from the total latency.
As shown in Figure 4a, the card processing delay
in the Encrypt operation increases with the size of the
input in a step-wise manner. This is because we limit
the maximum allowed plaintext data that can be en-
crypted within one DHIES session to be 2 KB. Hence,
for the input size of less than 2 KB, the card processing
cost is predominantly determined by the public key
operations in DHIES to derive the session keys. The
cost of the subsequent symmetric operations using
the session keys is almost negligible in comparison to
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Figure 4: Performance evaluation based on a proof-of-concept implementation using a resource-constrained
Java card (5 MHz processor). The same implementation should work several hundred times faster on a high-
performance Tamper Resistant Module such as IBM Storage Manager HSM (2 GHz processor) [43].
asymmetric operations. For the input size of between
2 KB and 4 KB, the card processing cost is almost
doubled because the encryption involves two DHIES
sessions.
Decrypt. As previously, due to the limited size of
the APDU buffer, the ciphertext has to be divided into
segments, with each segment not more than 255 bytes.
In the implementation, this operation has five steps.
First, the card receives the instance ID, the ephemeral
public key, the key confirmation string and the IV (for
AES-CBC decryption). After it successfully verifies the
key confirmation string, the card computes a 128-bit
AES encryption key and another 128-bit AES MAC
key. Second, it receives each ciphertext segment in se-
quence, decrypts each segment using the AES encryp-
tion key derived in step one and stores the decrypted
result in RAM. Meanwhile, it computes a MAC for
the received ciphertext using AES-CBC. This step is
repeated until receiving the penultimate segment of
the ciphertext. (The computed MAC becomes the IV
input for computing the next MAC using AES-CBC.)
Third, it receives the last segment of the ciphertext. It
decrypts the segment accordingly, saves the decrypted
data to an array in RAM, and also computes the final
MAC. Fourth, it receives a MAC. It checks it against
the MAC that was derived in the previous step. Fifth,
it returns the decrypted plaintext if the MAC was
verified successfully in the previous step. The last step
is called repeatedly until all plaintext data is returned.
All the intermediate results during the cryptographic
operations are stored in the volatile RAM. (Writing
data into EEPROM is much slower, and is subject to
a limited number of writing cycles, while writing data
in RAM is fast and incurs no limit in the number
of overwriting operations.) The decryption process is
summarized in Algorithm 2.
Since the card only returns the plaintext upon suc-
cessful verification of the MAC value, the maximum
Algorithm 2 Decryption in one DHIES session
Input: User instance reference Ci, ephemeral public key Qη , hashed
key confirmation key H(kc), encrypted message EAuthkη (m), elliptic
curve E with generator G of order n, secure hash function H ,
initialisation vector IV ;
Output: Message m or failure notification;
1: Client sends Ci, Qη , H(kc), IV to card;
2: Card retrieves the instance private key dCi corresponding to
user instance Ci;
3: Card validates Qη is a point on E of correct order;
4: Card sets k′c = H(dCi .Qη ‖ 0x11);
5: if H(k′c) = H(kc) then
6: Card Sets kencη = H(dCi .Qη ‖ 0x01);
7: Card sets kmacη = H(dCi .Qη ‖ 0x10);
8: Client divides EAuthkη (m) into segments Mi
9: for segments Mi do
10: Client sends Mi to card;
11: Card sets mi to be the decryption of Mi using AES-CBC
and key kencη and IV ;
12: Card generates a MACi for Mi using key kmacη with
initialisation vector set to ZERO when i = 0 and MACi−1
when i>0;
13: Card verifies that the final MAC generated equals the MAC
included with EAuthkη (m);
14: if MAC verification succeeds then
15: Card returns all mi to client;
16: else
17: Card returns failure notification to client;
18: else
19: Card returns failure notification to client;
allowed size of the ciphertext is determined by the
available RAM in the card. In the Java card that we
use, the chip has 8 KB RAM, more than half of which
is used to run the instance of the program. Through
experiment, we found that the maximum data that the
card can accommodate in RAM is 2 KB.
As shown in Figure 4b, the latency of the decryption
increases with the size of the ciphertext file in a similar
step-wise manner as in the encryption. As compared
with the encryption that involves two scalar multi-
plications over the elliptic curve, the decryption only
requires one. Hence, the latency of card processing in
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decryption (Figure 4b) is about half of that in encryp-
tion (Figure 4a). The latency of card communication
remains the roughly same in both cases. For an input
ciphertext file of 1 KB, the decryption takes about 2
seconds in total (0.5 seconds on the card processing).
Audit. This function requires the card to prove
that the two session keys in an earlier Encrypt opera-
tion had been derived correctly following the DHIES
specification. The main part in the implementation
is in computing a Zero Knowledge Proof to prove
the equality of two discrete logarithms. The imple-
mentation needs two primitive functions. The first is
to compute the scalar multiplication over the Ellip-
tic Curve and the second is to compute a modular
multiplication of two big numbers (32-byte modulus).
Although the Java Card Standard 2.2.2 [39] does not
provide any direct API to allow computing the scalar
multiplication over the EC, it is possible to (ab)use
the ECDH API as follows. First, the ECDH API is ini-
tialized with a pair of public/private keys, where the
private key is the scalar. Upon receiving an ephemeral
public key, the ECDH API does a scalar multiplication
over the elliptic curve and returns the ECDH shared
secret in the plain form. However, instead of returning
a point, the API only returns the x coordinate (more
specifically, the x coordinate of B = s ·X in the first
flow of the Chaum-Pedersen protocol; see Figure 2.)
Hence, the host has to reconstruct the point by calcu-
lating the y coordinate from one of the two possible
values. Once the whole point is reconstructed, the
Zero Knowledge Proof can be verified accordingly.
The limitation in the card API reduces the security
level of the ZKP by exactly one bit, because it halves
the search space of an exhaustive search attack.
As shown in Table 2, the audit function causes
10, 594 ms delay in the card processing. The most
significant cost factor is in doing the modular mul-
tiplication (i.e., computing t = s + c · r mod n in the
last step of the Chaum-Pedersen protocol; see Figure
2). It takes 9, 094 ms. This seemingly trivial calculation
incurs a long delay because there is no available API
in the Java card to do this operation efficiently and
we had to implement it from scratch in pure software
without any hardware support. We have tried our
best to optimize the code and also compared with
alternative methods (e.g., do a modular multiplication
by abusing the RSA encryption API as described in
[30]). It seems that the 9.094 seconds delay is probably
best we could achieve without getting any hardware
support from the card cryptographic co-processor3. It
is worth noting that the latency in audit is a constant
value. This is attributed to the use of explicit key
confirmation; otherwise, with the original DHIES, we
will have to feed in the entire encrypted message
and the latency for auditing will have a linear time
3. We contacted several Java card vendors and were glad to
learn from one vendor that adding native support for modular
multiplication was in their development plan for future products.
Operations Card processing Communication Total latency
KeyGen 782 53 835
Audit 10594 165 10759
Deletion 674 56 730
Table 2: Latency measurements (ms)
complexity O(n).
Delete. Upon receiving an index to the user in-
stance, this function erases the private key for the
specified user instance, by calling the clearKey method
of the javacard.security.key interface. This follows the
recommendation from the Java Card API Standard
(2.2.2) that a key should be cryptographically de-
stroyed through the clearKey method [39]. After the
private key is erased, the function returns an ECDSA
signature as specified in the SSE protocol. This delete
operation takes about 730 ms delay in total (see Table
2).
6 ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of the pro-
posed system, including the API security and the
threat analysis.
6.1 API security
In the SSE protocol, we have defined five API func-
tions. The KeyGen function simply generates keys on-
board. The Encrypt and Decrypt functions follow the
widely standardized DHIES, which has been proven
secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks [1]. We pro-
pose to add a key-confirmation string to DHIES in
order to provide explicit key confirmation, while the
original DHIES only provides implicit key confirma-
tion. The key-confirmation key is derived separately
from the encryption and MAC keys. This is to ensure
that the encryption and MAC keys remain indistin-
guishable from random after the key confirmation
step. Thus, the security proofs in DHIES [1] are not
affected. The use of explicit key confirmation allows a
more efficient implementation of the audit function.
In the Delete function, we use the well-established
ECDSA to cryptographically bind the TPM’s commit-
ment to delete a secret key with the outcome of the
deletion operation. We refer the reader to [1] and [37]
for the security of DHIES and ECDSA respectively.
Here, we will focus on the Audit function.
The Audit function serves as an enhancement to
DHIES. The aim is to allow users to verify if the
encryption had been correctly implemented following
the DHIES specification. To analyze the security of
this function, we will consider two types of attackers:
a passive attacker and an active attacker. We define
a passive attacker as one who obtains the ciphertext
only by calling the Encrypt function and subsequently
feeds the obtained ciphertext into the Audit function.
This is analogous to passively monitoring all inputs
and outputs while the user performs the Encrypt and
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Audit operations. We define an active attacker as one
who constructs his own ciphertext and then feeds it
into the Audit function.
Passive attack. First, we consider a passive attacker
and make the following claim with a sketch of its
proof.
Claim 1. Under the assumption that the underlying
Chaum-Pedersen ZKP is secure, the output of the audit
function does not reveal any information about the private
key dCi to a passive attacker.
Proof: In the case of a passive attack, the input
ciphertext will be successfully verified by the TPM
since it was generated by the same TPM earlier.
Given the input {dη · G,H(kc)}, the audit function
returns {dCi · dη ·G,ZKPη}. The ZKPη reveals nothing
more than one bit information about the truth of the
statement: the tuple {G, dCi · G, dη · G, dCi · dη · G}
is a DDH tuple4 (see [9]). We assume that the audit
function is called of an unlimited number of times.
The passive attacker records every input and output,
and eventually builds up a transcript of all possible
tuples, each comprising {dη · G, dCi · dη · G} (recall
that dη is dynamic and dCi is static.). However, he
can simulate the same transcript by generating the
random values dη by himself and computing dη ·dCi ·G
accordingly. In conclusion, he learns nothing about
dCi from the transcript that he can simulate all by
himself .
Active attack. Second, we consider an active at-
tacker and make the following claim with a sketch
of its proof.
Claim 2. Under the assumption that the Computational
Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem in the designated group is
intractable, and given that the ciphertext input, supplied
by an active attacker, has passed the internal verification
in the TPM, the input must have been generated with the
knowledge of the ephemeral private key dη .
Proof: Assume the attacker has calculated the
input to the audit function on his own, which includes
{dη · G,H(kc)}. To obtain a contradiction, we assume
the attacker does not know dη . Given the successful
public key validation on dη · G, it shows that dη · G
is a valid public key in the designated group over
the elliptic curve, so the discrete logarithm (i.e., the
private key) with respect to the base point G must
exist. In other words, the value dη actually exists.
Given the successful verification on the key confir-
mation, this gives the TPM explicit assurance that the
supplier of the input must have obtained the same
key-confirmation key kc, which is derived from the
ECDH shared plain secret through a one-way hash
function: kc = H(dCi ·dη ·G||0x11). Hence, the attacker
must have obtained the same ECDH shared plain
4. Since the non-interactive ZKP is obtained by applying the Fiat-
Shamir heuristics, a random oracle model is assumed.
secret. In summary, without knowing dCi or dη , the
attacker has computed dCi ·dη ·G from {dCi ·G, dη ·G}.
This contradicts the CDH assumption as stated in the
claim. In conclusion, the active attacker must have
known dη when computing his own input to the audit
function.
Obviously, if the attacker knows dη , he will learn
nothing from the Audit function as he is able to
compute the DDH tuple {G, dη ·G, dCi ·G, dCi · dη ·G}
all by himself.
6.2 Threat analysis
In the threat model defined in Section 4, we have
highlighted threats from three different angles. We
now analyze those threats in detail.
6.2.1 Data thief
We assume the attacker has physically captured the
TPM and the disk. Clearly, the attacker cannot make
use of the TPM without passing the authentication
mechanism. We further assume that the attacker has
had the user’s authentication credential, so he can
invoke all API functions of the TPM. Obviously, if
the keys have not been deleted, the attacker will be
able to trivially decrypt the ciphertext stored on the
disk. This is unstoppable as the attacker is essentially
no different from a legitimate user from the system’s
perspective. The basic design goal of the SSE system
is to prevent the attacker from recovering deleted
data. Hence, before the system falls into the enemy
hands, we assume that the user erases keys by calling
the Delete function, or in the extreme case, physically
destroying the TPM chip. The latter guarantees the
complete erasure of the keys, but in our analysis we
will focus on non-destructive means to delete data.
If the Delete function has been implemented cor-
rectly, the key should have been erased and its lo-
cation in memory be overwritten with random data.
This can prove extremely costly for the attacker to
recover the deleted key; without the key, the at-
tacker will have to do a ciphertext-only attack against
DHIES, which has been proved infeasible [1].
In order to recover the deleted key, the attacker has
to penetrate two layers of defence. First, he needs
to bypass the physical tamper resistance, so he can
gain access to the protected memory in the TPM.
Second, he needs to recover the overwritten bits in
the memory cells where the key was stored before the
deletion. Compromising both layers is not impossible,
but will incur a high cost to the attacker. This will be
an arms race between defenders and attackers, but if
the cost to attack is significantly higher than the value
of the target data, the thief may be deterred.
6.2.2 TPM provider
As explained above, if the TPM has i) encrypted data
correctly based on the DHIES algorithm, and ii) also
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erased keys properly from the protected memory, it
can prove prohibitively expensive for a data thief to
recover the deleted data. However, we shall not take
it for granted that the TPM provider must have imple-
mented both operations correctly. Software bugs are
one concern. We should also be wary of the possibility
that the TPM provider might be coerced by a powerful
state-funded adversary to insert a trapdoor into the
products.
Instead of completely trusting the TPM, we adopt
a “trust-but-verify” approach. More specifically, this
“trust-but-verify” is reflected in the design of the
SSE protocol in two aspects: verifiable encryption and
verifiable deletion.
Verifiable encryption. First, the encryption should
be verifiable. The SSE protocol allows the user to ver-
ify if the encryption has been implemented correctly
following the DHIES specification. This verification is
critical, because if the encryption had not been done
correctly in the first place, then deleting the key will
not logically lead to the deletion of data. In past work,
such verification is usually done implicitly – the fact
that the software program can reverse the encryp-
tion process and recover the same original plaintext
gives implicit assurance that the encryption was done
correctly. This kind of implicit verification is widely
used in software testing to ensure the encryption and
decryption are implemented correctly.
In a security-critical application, this kind of im-
plicit assurance is insufficient, especially when the
software program is encapsulated within a tamper
resistant device and its source code is totally inac-
cessible. We provide one possible attack in Figure 5.
Since the plaintext data normally contain redundan-
cies, the TPM can compress the data first before doing
encryption. The compression will create spare space
to insert a trapdoor block, which is the decryption
key wrapped by a trapdoor key (known to a state-
funded security agency). Given that the ciphertext
length remains the same and the encryption cipher
is semantically secure (i.e., the output of the encryp-
tion is indistinguishable from random), users cannot
distinguish the two ciphertexts in Figure 5. During the
decryption, the TPM can simply ignore the trapdoor
block and decrypt data as normal. This attack may be
mitigated by always requiring the data compression
first before encryption. However, a powerful state-
funded adversary may know a compression algorithm
that is more efficient than the publicly known ones.
A slight advantage in the compression ratio would
prove sufficient to insert a few extra bytes as the trap-
door. We assume the attacker’s goal to enable mass
surveillance over the Internet – once the ciphertext is
sent over the Internet (say to a remote storage server),
the attacker is able to trivially decrypt data without
anyone being aware of it.
Our solution to the above problem is through the
audit function. One trivial way to allow auditing the
Ek( compress(m) ) Ek’( k )
Ek( m )Ciphertext 1
Ciphertext 2
Figure 5: Ciphertext 1 is produced by an honest TPM
while ciphertext 2 is by a dishonest TPM. k is an
encryption key and k′ is a trapdoor key (known to a
state-funded security agency). Given that the encryp-
tion algorithm is semantically secure, users cannot
distinguish the two ciphertexts.
encryption is to reveal the user instance’s private key
dCi . But the private key dCi may have been used in
many DHIES sessions (each session is an invocation
of the Audit function). The auditing should be limited
to one specific session, but the revelation of dCi will
affect the secrecy of all other sessions. This reveals too
much information.
Another solution is to reveal the random factor dη
used in one DHIES session. With dη , the two session
keys can be derived and every byte in the ciphertext
can be fully verified accordingly. This does not affect
the secrecy of other sessions (since the random factors
are all different). However, the random factor dη is
only transient in memory during the encryption pro-
cess and is immediately erased once the encryption is
finished.
The technique we propose has the same effect as
revealing the random factor dη , but without having
to know dη . First of all, the TPM reveals the plain
ECDH shared secret: S = dCi · dη · G, which can
be easily computed since the TPM knows the user
private key dCi . With this revealed secret S, the two
session keys can be derived and every byte in the
ciphertext can be verified accordingly. However, in
addition to revealing S, the TPM must demonstrate
that S is well-formed. In other words, if we define
the tuple {G,C,N, S} = {G, dCi ·G, dη ·G, dCi ·dη ·G},
the revealed S will make the tuple form a valid
DDH tuple. This is equivalent to proving either of
the following two statements: 1) logG C = logN S; or 2)
logGN = logC S. The choice of the statement depends
on whether the prover knows either dCi or dη . In
our case, the TPM does not have dη , but it knows
dCi , hence is able to compute the ZKP based on the
Chaum-Pedersen protocol.
Verifiable deletion. Second, the deletion operation
should return a proof (ECDSA signature) that crypto-
graphically binds the commitment in deleting a secret
key with the outcome of that operation. If the TPM has
failed to erase the key correctly, the digital signature
will serve as publicly verifiable evidence to indicate
the security failure. Based on the evidence and the
terms in the Service Level Agreement, the user should
be entitled for compensation.
Traditionally, when one (say a researcher) wants
to demonstrate a security failure (or vulnerability) of
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a TPM, he would need to write a technical article,
post a video or do a live demo. Our protocol makes
this exposure process easier and more directly: just
publishing a short string of data (an ECDSA signature
and the recovered key) on the internet. Anyone will
be able to verify the digital signature and confirm the
evidence of security failure.
6.3 User
We consider a user who is a legitimate owner of a
SSE system. Depending on how the Service Level
Agreement is specified, the user should be entitled
to compensation (or money back) if she is able to
prove that the product is faulty. However, it is possible
that a user might want to profit from claiming for
compensation. To prove that the system is liable for
the security failure and hence claim compensation, the
user needs to present an ECDSA signature together
with the private key dCi (which is supposed to have
been deleted5).
In one attack, the user can do as a data thief would
do: 1) compromising the tamper resistance to gain
access to the TPM’s protected memory; 2) recovering
the overwritten key value in the protected memory in
the TPM.
However, instead of penetrating two layers of de-
fence, the user actually just needs to compromise one
layer. Once she is able to gain access to the protected
memory, she can extract an existing private key dCi in
memory and call the delete function to erase this key
in order to obtain an ECDSA signature. Equivalently,
she can extract the ECDSA private key and generate
her own ECDSA signature. The evidence itself does
not tell if the security failure is due to the compromise
of the ECDSA signing key or due to the recovery
of the allegedly deleted private key. But both keys
should have been kept in the secure memory of the
TPM. Hence, in any case, it should become publicly
clear that the claimed “tamper resistance” has been
compromised. As compared to a data thief, a user
exploits a short-cut in the attack as she does not need
to go further to recover the overwritten bits in the
memory. This needs to be considered in the pricing
strategy on determining the compensation amount in
the Service Level Agreement; we will leave this a
subject for future research.
7 CONCLUSION
While the “trust-but-verify” paradigm has been well
studied and established in some fields (e.g., e-voting),
it has been almost entirely neglected in the field of
secure data deletion. In this paper, we initiate an
5. The requirement of presenting the supposedly deleted private
key as part of the evidence may look strong, but without it any user
can arbitrarily claim fault in the product, and it will be difficult for
a third party to distinguish if the product is faulty indeed or a user
making a false claim.
investigation on how to apply the “trust-but-verify”
paradigm to make the data deletion process more
transparent and verifiable. We present a concrete cryp-
tographic solution, called Secure Storage and Erasure
(SSE), which enables a user to verify the correct
implementation of cryptographic operations inside a
TPM without having to access its internal source code.
The practical feasibility of our solution is validated by
a proof-of-concept implementation using a resource-
contained Java card as the TPM.
Future work includes extending the “trust-but-
verify” paradigm to other crypto primitives, in par-
ticular, the secure random number generator. The
problem of permitting end users to audit if a random
number has been generated correctly in a TPM as part
of the encryption process (or a cryptographic protocol)
is still largely unsolved and deserves further research.
SOURCE CODE
The source code for the Java card and host pro-
grams is publicly available at: https://github.com/
SecurityResearcher/SSE). Java cards can be purchased
from various sources, e.g., [41], [42].
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